NATO's final stroke

A diagnosis of “brain death”

When Emmanuel Macron declared NATO “brain dead” in November 2019, he was referring to the Alliance's loss of strategic direction, triggered by Donald Trump's decision the previous month to withdraw US forces from Syria. The US was abandoning a theater where twelve of its allies were simultaneously fighting the Islamic State, the Assad government, and Russia.

Assad and Russia were not primarily fighting ISIS. Rather, they were targeting forces opposed to the Syrian regime, groups supported in various ways by NATO countries. Damascus was in fact ISIS's largest clandestine buyer of oil, and two-thirds of Russian airstrikes hit moderate opposition groups. Russia was fighting for its own expansion, deploying a force that at its peak would include 21 military bases and 93 observation posts, including two naval facilities giving it unique access to the Middle East and Africa, its second major area of penetration.

In these circumstances, NATO's intervention in Syria was not only consistent with the Alliance's founding objective in 1949, namely to contain Russian expansion, but also with the broader objectives adopted in 1999, which authorized operations outside NATO's traditional area and against new forms of warfare.

A powerful and structural threat

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Gorbachev era had briefly raised hopes that the Russian threat was over. However, as early as 1990, the Transnistrian war saw the Russian 14th Army supporting Moldovan separatists. While it can be argued that the two Chechen wars (1994-2009) were internal conflicts within the Russian Federation, this argument was no longer sustainable in 2008: the Russian Georgian war resulted in the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the unilateral recognition of their independence, and the maintenance of Russian troops.

The danger resurfaced definitively in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass, immediately followed by the intervention in Syria. These military episodes were accompanied by a hybrid war waged on an exceptional scale in Estonia (2007), the Czech Republic and Bulgaria (2014-2015), with interference operations in Ukraine, Poland, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic States.

These were complemented by direct cyberattacks against banks, media, and public services; sabotage of power grids, ammunition depots, and critical infrastructure, including GPS; special operations under false flags; targeted assassinations; an attempted coup in Montenegro (2016); repeated airspace violations, dangerous overflights, maritime incursions and large-scale exercises near NATO borders; the use of migrants as a weapon; and persistent nuclear posturing.

Above all, vast disinformation campaigns were conducted throughout the West, including in the US, through fake social media accounts, propaganda websites, specialized TV channels, funding of nationalist think tanks and anti-European or Russophile parties, and the recruitment of politicians and influencers. The result was blatant electoral interference and a sustained effort to fracture Western democracies from within.

Two possible reasons for paralysis

Only two events could paralyze NATO: the disappearance of any Russian threat or the defection of the United States. Faced with the growing Russian danger, it was the latter that materialized, triggering the first “stroke.” Its immediate consequences occurred in Syria, where Turkey felt free to attack the Kurdish forces of the YPG. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Washington's main partner against ISIS, were weakened, and the vacuum was quickly filled by Iran through Hezbollah, while Damascus and Moscow regained control of the territories abandoned by US and Kurdish forces.

NATO thus found itself deprived of leadership by the unilateral decisions of a president whose Russophilia and hostility towards his allies were no secret to anyone, even when masked by pacifist rhetoric, complaints about burden-sharing, and almost daily changes of position. The dual danger posed by the growing threat from the East and the potential abandonment of the Alliance by its dominant power has caused deep concern among members. To allay these fears, they increased their defense spending, knowing full well that two-thirds of these amounts would go to US companies that shaped NATO standards and actively reduced the market share of the European military industry. The allies accepted to pay the price, recognizing that their rearmament was indispensable.

They hoped that the US would come to its senses. Despite harsh criticism—calling NATO obsolete (2017), issuing spending ultimatums and questioning Article 5 (2018), and withdrawing troops from Germany (2020-2021)—they remained hopeful.

A brief return to normal

The arrival of a Democratic administration in January 2021 seemed to mark a return to normal. President Biden reaffirmed the US commitment to transatlantic solidarity and the principle of collective defense set out in Article 5. Any overtures toward Russia ceased. Military aid to Ukraine was stepped up, but cautiously, so as not to provide a pretext for further aggression.

Between late 2021 and February 2022, NATO's eastern flank was strengthened, and additional troops were deployed to Europe. US intelligence services repeatedly warned of an imminent Russian attack, which materialized on February 24, 2022, in the form of a large-scale attempt to seize the entire country.

The Biden administration provided massive aid to Kiev, despite obstruction from MAGA supporters in Congress and what was undoubtedly excessive caution.

NATO experienced a rapid revival, crowned by the accession of Finland and Sweden. Trump's first term then came to be seen as an aberration.

A second stroke, more devastating

The illusion collapsed in 2025. A second Trump presidency, reinvigorated and unencumbered, resumed the dismantling of collective diplomacy and the alliance system established after 1945. Announcing that he could end the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours” thanks to his relations with Moscow, Trump once again denigrated NATO, portraying allies as freeloaders, using Article 5 as a trade lever and sidelining allies from negotiations transparently aimed at imposing a ceasefire on Russia’s terms.

At critical moments, he suspended military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine and publicly humiliated its president. Conversely, he eased sanctions against Russia and effectively neutralized US efforts to combat disinformation, allowing the Kremlin's aggression to intensify. Ultimately, the flow of US arms deliveries to Ukraine was gradually cut off and redirected to other theaters of operation.

The ruin of the Alliance denied in public

The disaster was so immense that NATO members avoided publicly acknowledging what they knew in their hearts to be betrayal. Admitting that the Alliance had effectively lost two-thirds of its forces—and that the US could prevent the deployment of much of the rest—would have meant acknowledging NATO's clinical death. A historic rapprochement with the Alliance's structural adversary had taken place, with profound consequences. As a result, a facade was hastily erected.

All additional budget requests were granted, despite deep uncertainty about how they would be financed, as leaders understood that these ever-increasing demands were essentially a pretext for turning away from the Alliance. Flattery became an art form, and leaders applauded diplomacy that contradicted NATO's fundamental principles. Deep down, however, many sensed that the break was irreversible.

What will follow

Even if a future US administration reverses the distancing, NATO's internal vulnerability has been exposed twice. The defense of an entire continent, planned over a 30-year horizon, cannot depend on an unstable partner that is likely to become neutral or even hostile every four years.

It is possible that an exhausted but resourceful Ukraine, supported by an underarmed but determined Europe, could manage to repel a Russian army whose combat power is reduced and dependent on a faltering economy. It is not inconceivable that Trump might feel he has done enough to satisfy the Kremlin's objectives under the guise of diplomacy. It is possible that subsequent electoral changes in Washington could offer a respite.

But it is now certain that European NATO members, convinced of the structural danger posed by Russia, will have to rearm independently, minimizing their purchases of US weapons, to prepare to defend their continent, alone, if necessary, with the help of non-European members. They will be able to do so by incorporating the low-cost model developed by Ukraine into their plans, before it is too late. Their most critical, but also most difficult, task will be to restore coordination.

Conversely, it is not inconceivable that the United States, when the time comes, will find itself alone in facing China, when it calls for solidarity from allies who have almost always followed it until now.

Like former Algerian President Bouteflika, whose aides raised their hands to simulate his lucidity, NATO will be celebrated long after its brain death, as long as it can function in some way despite the United States.